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This article examines a number of teaching resources produced by the Jubilee 
Centre for Character and Virtues, the leading centre for character education in the 
UK, in the light of the claim advanced by Kristján Kristjánsson, the centre’s 
deputy director, that various criticisms of character education are best regarded as 
‘myths’. The analysis provided in this article highlights significant shortcomings 
with these teaching resources, suggesting that far from being mythical, concerns 
about character and virtue being unclear, redundant, old fashioned, essentially 
religious, paternalistic, anti-democratic, anti-intellectual, conservative, 
individualistic, and relative, would seem, at least in the resources produced by the 




‘Grit’, ‘resilience’ and ‘character’ are current buzzwords for many politicians, educators 
and authors around the world. A number of bestselling North American books have 
praised the benefits of individual character development, variously promoting 
perseverance, curiosity and self-control (Tough, 2013), persistence and resilience 
(Duckworth, 2016), a growth mindset enabling children to bounce back from adversity 
(Dweck, 2012), and the nurture of ‘eulogy virtues’ (Brooks, 2016). Considerable 
interest in character education has been seen in a number of countries, including 
Canada, Australia, Singapore, Japan and Taiwan (e.g. Winton, 2008; Cranston et al., 
2010; Tan and Tan, 2014; Arthur et al., 2017; Kristjánsson, 2015).  
 
 
Several UK politicians support character education, most notably former 
Secretaries of State for Education Nicky Morgan (2017) and Damian Hinds (2019). The 
Department for Education (DfE) has promoted ‘resilience’, ‘grit’ and ‘self-efficacy’ as 
part of a social mobility agenda (Morgan, 2017), and has provided in excess of £14 
million in grants to character education projects (Marshall et al., 2017). In addition, a 
chain of Academy schools has been established to promote character (Allen and Bull, 
2018), a teachers’ association for character education has been established 
(www.character-education.org.uk), the school inspection service has incorporated 
character in its inspection handbook (Ofsted, 2019) and the DfE has published 
benchmarks for schools (DfE, 2019). 
The UK’s leading centre for the promotion of character education is the Jubilee 
Centre for Character and Virtues at the University of Birmingham. By 2017 the centre 
had received over £16 million from the controversial philanthropic organization the 
John Templeton Foundation (Allen and Bull, 2018, p.6), which supports synergies 
between religion and science, the development of moral character and the promotion of 
free markets (Bains, 2011). Allen and Bull (2018) examine the Jubilee Centre’s role in 
the emergence and development of a UK character education policy community, 
including a range of politicians, academics, philanthropists and think tanks seeking to 
influence government policy. They argue that this network’s agenda reflects the 
priorities of the John Templeton Foundation, promoting individualistic, free-market and 
socially conservative ideas. 
To some extent the criticisms of character education in Britain reflect the 
general arguments against character education (see the discussion of Kristjánsson 
below) but there are two inter-connected lines of critique that stand out as significant: 
first that character tends to favour the status quo, and second that it does so through 
misrepresenting social issues as individual moral issues. These can both be seen as 
elements of broader neoliberal developments in education policy (and social policy 
more generally). In relation to the first problem, Suissa (2015) criticises character 
education for its focus on the development of personal character traits, which tends to 
promote the idea that individuals must develop the personal capability to cope with 
adversity. This reflects Kohn’s (1997) argument that character education assumes adults 
need to ‘fix the kids’ rather than attend to structural inequalities. Such criticism 
responds directly to UK policymakers’ framing of character as a route to social 
 
 
mobility. In relation to the second problem, Bates (2019) has argued that the 
individualised focus of character distorts moral education because it detracts from the 
importance of intersubjective relationships as the basis of moral action. To some extent 
this reflects virtue ethicists concern with an individual’s ‘good character’ rather than on 
their actions in context (Jerome and Kisby, 2019). This individualised perspective 
ultimately excludes a political understanding of social problems, and therefore 
undermines the possibility of social rather than merely individual change (Suissa, 2015; 
Kisby, 2017). 
Spohrer and Bailey (2018) deepen this critique using Foucault’s work on 
‘governmentality’ and ‘biopolitics’ (see Burchell et al., 1991) which is concerned with 
the governmental techniques deployed to administer the life of a given population, and 
which attempt to shape citizen behaviour to create governable subjects. Whilst there are 
historical precedents in Victorian social reformers’ attitudes to the poor (Taylor, 2018, 
p.6), Spohrer and Bailey (2018) argue that character education in the current British 
context indicates a shift in the governance of citizens that increasingly draws on 
biological and psychological understandings of how individuals can improve their own 
economic position in society (Ecclestone, 2012). This article answers their call for a 
critical debate about the ‘assumptions and values’ that underpin contemporary forms of 
character education. It does this through a detailed examination of the teaching 
materials produced by the Jubilee Centre so as to scrutinise the ideas driving character 
educators and how these manifest themselves in these resources.  
 
Kristjánsson’s defence of character education 
A varied literature defending character education has emerged alongside, and often in 
response to, this growing critique. One common response is to argue that a closer 
reading of Aristotle can provide a better balanced model of character education (Hart, 
forthcoming), for example, Peterson (2019) draws on the concepts of civic virtue and 
deliberation, to answer the critics’ concerns that character education pays insufficient 
attention to the political realm. Curren (2017) takes a different approach and rejects 
current policy definitions (such as perseverance and resilience) to embrace a much 
wider account of character, which (somewhat unexpectedly) incorporates policy 
promoting fundamental British values. Whilst the to and fro of debate helps to clarify 
 
 
the points of contention / refine character education (depending on one’s perspective), 
these defences also highlight how the type of character education promoted by its 
advocates is relatively fast-changing. Whilst one can engage in further theoretical 
debate about whether these revised models really do overcome the problems identified 
by critics, it leaves open the question about whether character education programmes 
ever really embody these increasingly nuanced philosophical solutions.  
In order to explore that issue, this article focuses on what Kristjánsson regarded 
as ‘Ten Myths about Character, Virtue and Virtue Education’ (Kristjánsson, 2013). By 
articulating and countering these myths he attempted to establish a robust case in 
defence of character education. As he is Deputy Director of the Jubilee Centre, we use 
Kristjánsson’s own criteria to critically evaluate some of the classroom teaching 
resources developed there. 
Kristjánsson (2013) defends character education against a number of criticisms: 
character and virtue are unclear; redundant; old fashioned; essentially religious; 
paternalistic; anti-democratic and anti-intellectual; conservative; individualistic; 
relative; and situation specific. In the space available it is difficult to do justice to his 
whole argument, but the following synopsis provides a sense of the lines he pursues. 
First, he argues that education abounds with unclear concepts, and we just have 
to theorise them, and develop practice around them (p. 270).  
Second, he notes that there has been a general a rise in new ways to talk about 
the self (such as self-esteem or self-efficacy), but we still talk about general qualities 
such as compassion, fairness, loyalty etc., which indicates some abiding recognition that 
virtues are significant. From this he draws the conclusion that character is not redundant 
because it is valuable to provide a vocabulary for naming and discussing these 
important phenomena (p. 273).  
Third, Kristjánsson contends that, far from being old-fashioned, virtue ethics is 
actually now a mainstream contemporary approach to moral philosophy, claiming that it 
is now “the moral theory of choice” (p. 274) in medicine and education.  
Fourth, he asserts that whilst religions generally include an account of character 
and virtue, it is equally possible to conceive of them outside of religious traditions, for 




Fifth, he argues that some form of character education in schools is inevitable 
because character is formed through interactions with others, which are an intrinsic part 
of school life. The only real choice is therefore whether one plans a character education 
programme purposefully, or simply leaves it to chance (p. 276).  
Sixth, Kristjánsson does recognise that there is a problematic leap between the 
“inculcation of character by means of repeated action under outside guidance” and the 
production of “critical independent moral choosers” (p. 277). He recognises that 
Aristotle does not sufficiently account for this, but suggests that phronesis, developed 
through reasoning and reflection on action, is the essential explanation because “truly 
virtuous persons not only perform the right actions, but they perform them for the right 
reasons and from the right motives” (p. 277). This need to give reasons also prevents 
character education, he argues, from being anti-intellectual.  
Seventh, Kristjánsson acknowledges that in America character education has 
often been linked to the conservative right, but he contends that this is not a necessary 
connection and that virtue ethics is entirely compatible with a progressive or reformist 
political outlook (pp. 278-9).  
Eighth, in relation to the idea that character education is excessively 
individualistic, he argues that in part this reflects a pragmatic approach to teaching, in 
that it is simply easier to start with the individual in school than with a discussion about 
society as a whole (p. 279). He also points out that Aristotle is not an individualist and 
recognises that we are social animals and that the good life requires participation in a 
collective public life. 
Ninth, Kristjánsson argues that character and virtues are obviously universal, 
although he concedes specific behaviours may vary with time or place.  
Finally, he deals with the situationist critique largely by dismissing the 
methodology of the situationists, arguing they tend to focus on exaggerated or unusual 
situations to make their point (p. 282). Whilst it is true that behaviour is inevitably a 
result of individual characteristics and situational factors, he says, we need to ask what 






The Jubilee Centre holds in excess of 5,000 documents on its website, so it is not 
feasible to conduct a comprehensive analysis of all of the output. Our selection of 
resources has been driven by Kristjánsson’s argument. For each pair of ‘myths’ 
discussed above, we have identified some key questions and selected resources that 
appeared to be most relevant to those questions. We were looking for resources that 
focused on the issues raised by Kristjánsson and which offered specific activities and 
material to use in the classroom with students (as opposed to general advice to 
teachers). Once the selection of resources had been made, we undertook a more detailed 
second reading, during which the text was annotated to highlight areas where the key 
question was being addressed, or where the resources reflected particular issues 
emerging from Kristjánsson’s discussion. This approach draws on An and Suh’s work 
(2013) which similarly used questions derived from their critical discussion of the 
relevant literature to investigate the ideological interpretations evident in classroom 
resources. To illustrate how we selected resources, in relation to the first category 
(character is an unclear and redundant concept) we were aware that Kristjánsson has 
argued that moral educators should revert to medieval and ancient texts because: 
modernist literature has long since given up on the idea of moral didactics and… 
postmodern literature has relinquished altogether the emancipatory impulse for 
self-knowledge and self-clarification (Kristjánsson, 2015, p. 160). 
We therefore selected two of the ‘classic’ stories from the Knightly Virtues pack to 
explore the extent to which the resources sustained a clear and consistent interpretation 
of the virtues they were supposed to illustrate. This seemed to us to take Kristjánsson’s 
intentions and educational aspirations seriously.  
This approach was devised to focus on some particularly apposite examples, as a 
form of purposive sampling (Neumann, 2011) to provide a litmus test for the criteria 
established by Kristjánsson. Whilst the resources selected for review were considered 
with specific questions in mind (see table 1) there was also a guiding question: do the 
educational resources fulfil the promise of Kristjánsson’s defence?  
 




[INSERT TABLE HERE] 
 
Problems with the teaching resources 
In the next section we discuss our analysis of these resources. We argue that the 
materials promoted by the Jubilee Centre almost entirely fail to live up to the standards 
established by Kristjánsson and that far from being myths, these established criticisms 
of character education guide us to some problems at the heart of their education 
programmes. In addition, our analysis leads us to formulate a new criticism, that the 
process of translating virtue ethics into character education lessons may itself be a 
problematic step – one which is generally overlooked in the literature which is largely 
concerned with philosophical critique. 
Unclear and redundant 
One of the starting points for the Jubilee Centre’s work is that children lack a language 
for engaging with character and virtue and so many of the resources aim to explicitly 
teach relevant vocabulary. For example, The Knightly Virtues project is based on the 
virtues of humility, honesty, love, service, courage, justice, self-discipline, and gratitude 
(Jubilee Centre n.d. a) illustrated through a series of stories about heroic individuals 
(Jubilee Centre n.d. b). The evaluation report clarifies that the key objective of this 
project is to enhance “virtue literacy”, comprising virtue knowledge, reasoning, and 
practice (Arthur et al. 2014, p. 9).  
The stories in these resources have been adapted “to highlight certain issues and 
are not an accurate historical record” (Jubilee Centre n.d. c), for example, in the story of 
Joan of Arc, some “incidents have not been included in the story presented in the pack 
as the political and religious dimensions of Joan’s trial are very complex and demanding 
for pupils to understand” (Jubilee Centre n.d. b, p. 104). This is justified by Aristotle’s 
argument that narrative has the “power to illuminate moral aspects of human 
motivation” and MacIntyre’s argument that stories provide an essential context for 
understanding moral agency (Arthur et al. 2014, p. 9). 
As an example of this selectivity at work, the narrator of the Joan of Arc story 
comments how unusual it was for a girl to dress as a boy and cut her hair short (Jubilee 
 
 
Centre n.d. b, p. 112), but there is no similar qualification or comment about how usual 
it was to hear messages from God relayed through the voices of angels. Joan’s visions 
and premonitions are recounted as facts, “Joan had accomplished all that her voices said 
she would.  She had served her country and its King faultlessly” (p. 117). This enables 
the narrator to conclude that:  
Joan was a true and honourable woman who always put other’s needs before her 
own and gave her life in the service of her country.  She was courageous, brave and 
showed tremendous fearlessness in the face of danger.  I hope you… can 
understand how doing things for the benefit of others, even when you might be 
scared or nervous, can benefit the greater good (p. 117). 
Even these simplified stories fail to sustain a clear focus on the virtues. The story of 
Joan of Arc is supposed to demonstrate courage, but fails to reflect on the fact that she 
died for a king who betrayed her, based on a religiously inspired vision, which may well 
be a symptom of mental illness. The moral lessons are far from clear and elsewhere in 
the Jubilee Centre’s resources they argue that ‘over-doing’ the virtue of courage could 
be seen in acts which display “hallmarks of ostentation… which may lead to significant 
harm and damage for the individual” (Wright et al. n.d. a, p. 6) – this might at least lead 
one to wonder whether Joan had similarly strayed from the golden mean. These 
resources seem not to sustain a clear focus on the concepts they seek to promote, 
indicating that these moralising stories might be more challenging to teach than 
Kristjánsson implies. 
The authors of the Knightly Virtues evaluation report argue that mastery of such 
virtues terminology is essential because “no conduct could be considered truly virtuous 
without some meaningful grasp of what this, and related moral terms, mean” (Arthur et 
al., 2014, p. 9). It seems strange then, that the evidence indicates no statistically 
significant improvement in pupils’ knowledge of virtue concepts, but a significant rise 
in their application of them, which, according to the preceding argument, seems 
illogical. Regardless, the evaluation evidence demonstrates that there is very little 
positive impact even in relation to the rather limited aspiration to teach specialist 
vocabulary through stories. 
 
 
Old-fashioned and religious 
In the secondary curriculum resources a lesson on the virtue of self-mastery starts with 
this statement: “those who can exercise the virtue of self-mastery particularly well have 
an excellent relationship with all of life’s sensual pleasures, including food, drink and, 
in its proper context, sex” (Wright et al. n.d. b, p. 1). The resource advises pupils to look 
for the emotional triggers, which might alert them to the need for this virtue:  
When you recognise a desire for pleasurable things, such as food, drink, sex, 
amusement or knowledge.  If these desires are so strong that you feel overpowered 
by them, then you need to practice the virtue of self-mastery; or if your desires 
towards these things disgust or pain you (p. 2).  
The authors note that some “failures in self-mastery can be the result of pathological 
medical or mental health issues, rather than moral failings” and cite examples such as 
alcoholism, eating disorders or, rather bizarrely, the “wish to eat humans, coal or dirt…  
Or desire to have sex with blood relatives, children or animals” (p. 3). However, having 
acknowledged that some behaviours are linked to mental health problems or addiction, 
the resource swiftly moves on to a paired discussion task in which pupils are asked to 
consider whether drug addiction, cigarette addiction, and X-box addiction are examples 
of illness or moral failing. To help them with their deliberations the pupils are prompted 
to consider what is “the chief difference between an illness and a moral failing?” And, 
“if addiction can be changed without medication, is it really an illness?” (p. 4).  
No further information is provided for the task, which therefore seems likely to 
simply recycle pre-existing knowledge and prejudices, instead of developing more 
informed opinions. The three examples of addiction are clearly very different – in what 
sense is an addiction to gaming the same as an addiction to heroin? Nevertheless, 
providing the three examples without overtly problematizing that slippery term 
‘addiction’ seems likely to create the impression that all are similar phenomena. The 
guidance also misleadingly suggests that the definition of an illness is that it is treated 
with medication. Clearly one cannot treat excessive on-line gaming with medication, 
therefore if all these cases are equivalent, then the pupil is being led to a similar 
conclusion about them all. It seems to us that this activity actually serves to marginalise 
or discount mental illness as distinct from physical illness and it leads pupils to focus on 
moral failings.  
 
 
Later in the resource we return to sexual morality with the observation that,  
It is also important to note that to enjoy any wrong object at all is to enjoy it too 
much.  So, if I enjoy… alcohol under the age of 18, or sex outside the context of 
permanence, then I have erred…  They are simply not objects that are fitting for 
that stage of my life…  Similarly, to drink weed-killer for pleasure is to err grossly 
(p. 5).  
This raises several reasonable questions: Why is having a respectful consensual 
(temporary) sexual relationship erring?  Why is having a glass of wine with dinner 
wrong? And how is either of these comparable to poisoning oneself?  This seems to get 
to the heart of the problem with these resources specifically, and with character 
education in general. Its attraction is that it enables adults to promote a substantive 
ethical position, as Kristjánsson explains, it “requires direct teaching about the nature of 
the well-rounded life,” but this inevitably opens up a “can of worms” (2016, p. 485). It 
may well be that Kristjánsson feels it is possible to navigate these difficulties without 
defaulting to old-fashioned or religious morality, but it is difficult to see these moral 
judgements as not simply reflecting the sexual mores of the Judeo-Christian tradition. 
Perhaps to compound this connection, there is an information box at this point in the 
resource to discuss the productive nature of shame, which notes that “shame can 
contribute a great deal to growth in the virtue of self-control” (Wright et al. n.d. b, p. 5). 
In brief then, this resource informs pupils that desire is generally a trigger 
emotion for the need for self-mastery; that sex and alcohol in particular (for children 
below the age of 18) are always wrong; and that feelings of shame will help them. 
Further it strongly implies that addiction is generally a moral failing rather than a 
genuine health problem. By contrast, we would argue that it is perfectly possible to 
develop a defensible moral position which recognises the sexuality of teenagers and the 
role of respectful, consensual sexual relationships; and to acknowledge that alcohol 
consumption should be learned about in social and familial settings. We also recognise 
that much contemporary policy around addiction recognises it is a health issue rather 
than a moral one. To assert a position of denial and abstinence is morally contentious 
and potentially dangerous because abstinence programmes often produce a raft of 
unintended negative health results (Advocates for Youth, 2007). 
 
 
Paternalistic, anti-democratic and anti-intellectual 
Kristjánsson et al. (2017) report on the impact of a resource pack aimed at promoting 
gratitude and other related ‘allocentric’ virtues. This includes a teachers’ handbook 
Growing Gratitude (Jubilee Centre n.d. d) and an accompanying student workbook St 
Oscar’s Oscars (Jubilee Centre n.d. e), and a second teacher handbook on Cultivating 
Compassion (Jubilee Centre n.d. f) with a related student workbook on The Good 
Samaritan (Jubilee Centre n.d. g). These resources promote a particular type of process, 
one that might be seen to encourage the reflection and reasoning that is said to develop 
phronesis. Pupils are required to write thank you letters, keep a gratitude journal, 
undertake gratitude re-framing exercises, and also to engage in Loving Kindness 
Meditation (LKM) activities – several of which are drawn from forms of therapy (Zeng 
et al., 2015).  
In these activities the focus is internal and emotional. In one lesson, pupils are 
encouraged to find news stories featuring people in pain or distress, and then to imagine 
they are the suffering person, and resolve what they can do to help (Jubilee Centre n.d. 
f, pp. 17-19). In another lesson, pupils are encouraged to meditate on a golden light and 
to imagine standing in the warm glow with friends (Jubilee Centre n.d. f, pp. 9-11). In 
another activity pupils are asked to recall incidents which have been challenging and to 
“find ways to be thankful for what happened to me now even though I was not at the 
time it happened” (Jubilee Centre n.d. d, p. 12). Rather than seeking to develop young 
people’s moral reasoning, the activities seem to intensify pupils’ feelings to underscore 
an ethical principle. The moral conclusions are pre-determined – one should empathise 
with others’ suffering, nurture a feeling of common humanity, and find the silver lining 
in the dark cloud. But none of that opens up the genuinely contentious moral territory 
associated with these issues – why do people suffer, and why do most of us live our 
everyday lives without worrying about that suffering? Why are some people’s lives 
blighted with hardship and suffering, and what are the structural inequalities that 
influence this? What should be done about it individually and collectively?  
If phronesis represents a form of practical wisdom, there is little in these 
resources that seems to seriously encourage it. The ethical conclusions are already 
made, indeed some of these stories are so one-dimensional that there is really no room 
for pupils to engage, reflect and form their own opinion. Pupils are led to obvious 
conclusions, encouraged to reflect on why these are right, and then further encouraged 
 
 
to identify these right responses with emotional responses. Writing in another context, 
Kemmis has commented that we can sometimes invoke phronesis as “magical powers 
possessed by sages and superheroes” (Kemmis, 2012, p. 153) in order to fill the gap 
between what we know and what we want. In this case it seems that Kristjánsson 
requires phronesis to bridge the gap between behavioural training and moral wisdom, 
but on the basis of these resources, that seems unlikely. 
Conservative and individualistic 
The Knightly Virtues pack includes a case study of Rosa Parks, the black American 
Civil Rights campaigner (Jubilee Centre n.d. b). In the children’s version of the story, 
there is a section that briefly mentions that Parks married and returned to college. But in 
her own autobiographical account it is much more evident that her marriage and 
education were overtly political acts – she describes falling in love with her husband 
because he was the only black man she had met who was not afraid of white people and 
describes him as the first real activist she ever met. Her decision to return to college was 
also influenced by her husband’s belief that education was vital for black people and 
she mentions the importance of her educational experiences in the NAACP, thus clearly 
linking her educational experiences and her political commitment. The rewritten story is 
not just a simplified text, it is an essentially de-politicised text, in which important life 
decisions are stripped of their political connection. This means that justice (defined in 
this resource as having “an understanding of what it is to uphold what is right”) 
becomes a personal characteristic rather than a political issue, or a feature of society. 
In this example we see how the focus on individual character and virtues 
actually distorts the narrative, focusing the pupils’ attention on the personal, emotional 
dimension to the story (falling in love, being brave and standing up) and away from the 
political dimension (marrying an activist, educating oneself in activist methods, 
becoming a political organiser). One may seek to justify this on pedagogic grounds 
(although we would disagree), for example, by contending that the individual 
motivation and simplified narrative are easier for young readers to understand; but it 
would be naïve to think that the story does not excessively individualise and de-
politicise the events.  
We think this problem runs deeper than a misguided attempt to make a 
complicated story more accessible, as can be seen if we turn to consider a research 
 
 
instrument employed by the Jubilee Centre in an investigation of character in UK 
schools (Arthur et al., 2015). Because character education is premised on the belief that 
there are right or wrong ethical decisions (not just variously sound ethical decision-
making procedures), the research includes the Ad-ICM questionnaire (adolescent 
intermediate concept measure) to gauge pupils’ ability to make the right decisions. 
Pupils are presented with stories and a range of possible actions and justifications for 
them. Their answers are compared to those recommended by an expert panel and a 
score is calculated to reflect how close they come to the expert answers. In one scenario 
a girl is invited to join the school gymnastics team (Arthur et al., 2015, p. 33). Whilst 
this is a great opportunity for her, she is concerned that the teacher in charge uses 
photos of the girls he considers to be good-looking to get publicity for the team, and she 
feels this goes against her beliefs and values. In brief the options presented are: 
(1) Quit and explain why. 
(2) Complete the tasks but clarify publicly she disagrees with the photos. 
(3) Do what her parents think best. 
(4) Talk to the teacher to try to stay out of the publicity photos.  
(5) Think about the impact on her. 
(6) Think about the impact on her friends. 
(7) Try to change the publicity photo arrangements. 
(8) Carry on. 
The justifications available can be summarised as follows: 
(1) It’s just photos. 
(2) It’s a great opportunity for an athletics career. 
(3) Compromising her values will make her unhappy. 
(4) She wouldn’t succeed in gymnastics if she was unhappy about the media. 
(5) It’s better in the long run not to compromise one’s values or beliefs. 
(6) Others know best. 
(7) She has to find a way to deal with such problems. 
(8) If she quits someone else will take her place anyway. 
(9) Compete, do well, and use her position to negotiate later. 
(10) Stand up for her beliefs and strengthen them through sacrifice. 
(11) Beliefs come and go but opportunities like this are rare. 
 
 
It seems to us that there is no right answer, and probably no more convincing 
justification. One could imagine a young person engaging with this dilemma and 
devising any number of defensible responses. But what is particularly interesting in 
relation to this sub-section is that the dilemma is presented as a purely individual one 
for the girl to deal with. In reality, the problem relates to the male teacher’s attitude and 
action, and the fact that this appears to be condoned by the school management. Indeed, 
this example brings to mind the horrendous real-life case of Larry Nassar, the team 
doctor for USA Gymnastics, who was jailed for multiple sexual assaults on teenage 
gymnasts over years. Accusations by individual gymnasts were not believed and acted 
upon at the time. In fact, the solution to misogyny is unlikely to be in the hands of a 
lone teenage gymnast and one might argue that a proper analysis of the problem would 
require a wider discussion of sexism, of institutional discrimination and prejudice, and 
of collective action for equality. By posing this as a personal ethical problem, the real 
solutions and justifications seem to be absent (see also Suissa, 2015 and Winton, 2008). 
This is not just a focused method, it is a distorted one, and the distortion stems from the 
focus on character, virtues and the individualised and de-politicised vision this tends to 
impose. 
Relative and situation specific 
As we have already seen, character education often relies on case studies and narratives 
to communicate abiding truths about the virtues, so it seems reasonable to explore how 
this works in practice. In examining this aspect of the work, we draw on Flyvbjerg’s 
defence of case studies as providing the ideal vehicle for capturing phronesis. He quotes 
Aristotle:  
Phronesis is not concerned with universals only, it must also take cognizance of 
particulars, because it is concerned with conduct, and conduct has its sphere in 
particular circumstances (Aristotle in the Nichomachean Ethics, quoted in 
Flyvbjerg, 2001, p. 70).  
This leads Flyvbjerg to conclude that “the judgement, which is central to phronesis…is 
always context-dependent” (Flyvbjerg, 2001, p. 136). There are two types of approach 
evident in these resources. Firstly, case studies are distorted and presented out of 
context, and we have already considered this in relation to Rosa Parks’ involvement in 
 
 
the NAACP; secondly, cases are strewn through lessons like decorations. A secondary 
lesson on ‘Why do good people do bad things?’ (Wright et al. n.d. c) provides an 
example of this second approach. The PowerPoint for this unit starts with a series of 
activities looking at the meaning of utopia, the bystander effect, the Milgram 
experiment, and the Good Samaritan before finally alighting on a case study of the 
London Riots of 2011. The first slide on the riots shows a young person with a scarf 
over their face and hoody over their head, running in front of a burning car with the 
starter question “how does what you have learned over the past three sessions help to 
explain why good people rioted in 2011?” This is followed by the question, “what was 
lacking in their character?” The lesson then moves directly on to consider the local 
residents who turned out to clean up the streets the following day, followed by an 
individual investigation into any resistance movement (focusing on whether one could 
justify terrorism within that struggle), and then pupils are presented with Niemöller’s 
famous lines about totalitarianism: “First they came for the Socialists and I did not 
speak out… Then they came for me and there was no one left to speak for me.” Then 
students are given a definition of tyranny, directed to the Genocide Watch website, and 
finally asked to reflect on what virtues they would like to develop to help them do good 
things in difficult situations.  
These five lessons set out to guide pupils from initially thinking about moral 
decisions and the factors that influence us (such as fear of authority), through to the 
nature of moral heroism, and finally into civic virtues (defined as doing good things in 
communities). To say the least, this path is plotted through a rather bewildering array of 
complex case studies – pupils encounter a range of psychological experiments, an 
example of contemporary urban unrest, volunteering, totalitarianism, genocide, 
terrorism, political resistance movements from around the world and finally pupils are 
asked to attempt to distil some personal virtue targets from this conveyor belt of 
atrocities, all with the supposed focus of considering why good people do bad things. 
The resources provide almost no context within which actions can be properly 
understood or judged. By way of contrast, a group of young people affected by the 
London Riots produced a documentary with young people who were personally 
involved (Fully Focused online, 2012). This resource provides plenty of scope to reflect 
on the case study, to consider the actions undertaken and the sense participants made of 




Spohrer and Bailey’s (2018) critique of character education centres on how it is used as 
a mechanism of neoliberal governmentality, which involves significant state 
intervention to bring market rationality to as many sites of human activity as possible, 
with individuals ‘disciplined’ to act in self-optimising, competitive and individualistic 
ways (see e.g. Brown, 2003; Gilbert, 2013). Through our critical analysis of teaching 
resources we have demonstated how they routinely over-simplify and individualise the 
analysis of social and political situations, and promote an intense form of “self-work” 
(Gerrard, 2014) blending “emotional regulation, resilience, altruism, [and] 
responsibility… with positive psychology” (Ecclestone, 2014, p.469). In doing so these 
resources promote a model of change in which the individual assumes responsibility for 
their own moral improvement as the precursor to any positive change in the wider 
world. Justice is rendered a personal character trait, politics largely disappears from 
view, to be replaced with the search for individual moral improvement. To the extent 
that the individual is promoted as the main unit of analysis, and political understanding 
is avoided, we would concur with Spohrer and Bailey’s analysis. 
Whilst Kristjánsson might believe the resources could be salvaged if they were 
brought into better alignment with his theoretical model, we believe these flaws reflect 
some fundamental problems with character education. By focusing on the materials 
designed for students we have clarified the following lines of critique, some of which 
have been absent or underplayed in the existing literature. Firstly, we suspect it is 
difficult for character education in practice not to be excessively focused on 
individualistic and de-politicised accounts, because these accounts are developed on the 
basis of individualistic and de-politicised premises, i.e. the philosophy of virtue ethics.  
Secondly, we also suspect that the process of ‘phronesis’ invoked in 
Kristjánsson’s account of character education is providing cover for an inadequate 
conceptualisation of how a person engages in moral reasoning. Ultimately there is little 
room for moral reasoning in the classroom if someone else already knows both what a 
student’s answer should be, and what reasons are acceptable. Similarly, there is little 
incentive for a teacher to develop detailed case studies, reflecting contextually specific 
phronesis, if they believe that the correct ethical answer is already clearly evident.  
Thirdly, it seems to us that there is problematic leap from the foundational ideas 
in virtue ethics to the practical content of a lesson. McCowan (2009) has observed that 
 
 
curriculum policy is translated from fairly vague aspirations to increasingly concrete 
activities and experiences as policy moves from government to mediating institutions, 
and from those institutions to schools, then through schools to class teachers, and finally 
from teachers to students. Each of these steps can be seen as a leap from one type of 
activity to another – from abstract philosophical goals to specific tasks and worksheets. 
As we have read these resources we have been struck by the idea that, whilst virtue 
ethics has been criticised for being too vague about what one should do in any given 
situation (Kisby, 2017) the resources themselves struggle with the opposite problem – 
they seem all too willing to assert unjustified right answers in any situation. This 
introduces a new line of critique about the problems of translation and interpretation as 
one moves from what McCowan (p. 90) calls “ideal ends” to the “real means” of lesson 
plans and materials. It further suggests that claims to have resolved the problems with 
character education theoretically should be met with caution, and the materials 
produced by character advocates should be subjected to equal scrutiny. 
Our analysis also raises the question of whether dedicated character lessons 
should be delivered at all in schools. Interestingly, as Purpel (1997, p.143) notes, 
advocates of character education often argue that schools inevitably promote values and 
therefore, directly or indirectly, inevitably engage in character development. It seems 
then that character educators simply to wish to seize control of how this is done, but the 
analysis of these resources indicates why such a form of moral education would be 
deeply conservative. Moreover, as we have argued, their vision of social development is 
problematic, being premised on the idea that individuals must improve themselves in 
order to improve society. In contrast, in our view, social progress can best be achieved 
by engaging young people in collective acts of citizenship, in which political problems 
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